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Preface

Introduction
The United States Government continues to struggle with integrating its abundant capabilities because of competing departmental cultures, mandates, and operating styles. One root of the multi-faceted interagency problem is the prototypical government employee, a person incubated in a single agency, steeped in a narrow ‗world view', specialized in particular tasks, and insulated from the rest of the government. When faced with a roster of insular team members, government leaders with short timelines have resorted to ad hoc interagency solutions with predictably poor results.
1 Furthermore, under-resourced departments have been forced to call upon other organizations to cover their responsibilities. 2 To make things worse, the pool of individuals accustomed to working across departmental boundaries is frustratingly shallow.
Over the last several years, the United States Government (USG) has taken some tentative steps toward deepening this ‗human capital' pool. From building interagency coordination groups, to laying the groundwork for a deployable Civilian Response Corps (CRC), the government is moving slowly toward greater interagency capacity. However, much remains to be done. To begin, the government needs to solidify gains by nurturing human capital initiatives already underway, and by encouraging new advances in the field. Furthermore, in order to guide new advances, the USG must commit to a human capital strategy and see it through to completion. Thus, the goal of this paper is to propose such a strategy, and present a composite model the government might use to develop its human capital in the short term, while simultaneously building a professional interagency workforce in the long term.
In order to achieve its goal, the paper begins with a brief survey of the literature on the human capital problem, chronicling a number of policy resolutions and studies over the past twelve years. The reader will find a common theme throughout this period: namely, plenty of words, but too little action. As the survey will show, personnel problems are exceedingly complicated, involving many different agencies and individuals. This complexity has led to governmental inertia and a decided lack of ‗follow-through' on the resolutions and studies.
The complexity issue is central to this paper, and forms the basis of the next chapter.
Multiple questions drive the complex human capital problem. Fundamentally, how will the USG develop interagency experts, and what incentives might lure people into such a career? 3 Does the term ‗interagency expert' imply an exclusive, new career field, or will experts continue to work in their previous professions? In addition to finding suitable candidates, decision-makers must figure out what the new human capital system should look like. Will it be centrally controlled, similar to a government department, or instead resemble a network of loosely affiliated groups? These are obviously difficult questions that must be addressed in any comprehensive human capital strategy.
In the context of this complex problem, numerous on-going interagency achievements are worthy of note, and the ensuing chapter will consider a few of these. For example, the USG has taken effective steps to improve its Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations, interagency efforts that have proven extremely problematic in the past. 4 In addition, the government has fostered better interagency coordination at the Regional Combatant 8
Commanders' headquarters, and has sponsored an initiative in Washington to develop a cadre of national security professionals who can move easily among government agencies.
After outlining some of the current-day efforts to build human capital, the paper will propose several models for the USG to consider. In particular, the study will examine four ways of producing and organizing interagency professionals, presenting each plan with its own strengths and weaknesses. These candidate models will lead into the paper's final chapter, which suggests a strategy for building an interagency workforce, and proposes a composite model to implement that strategy.
Notes
(All notes in this paper appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)
Setting the Stage
As mentioned in the introduction, many have written about fixing the human capital problem, but few have taken action. This chapter will concentrate strictly on literature pertaining to human capital development, particularly official governmental publications. It will not address the significant body of literature devoted to improving interagency cooperation.
Although the two topics are closely related, the latter discussion is too broad for the scope of this paper. Furthermore, this chapter will focus on events from the last twelve years, even though efforts to produce interagency professionals date back to the 1940's. NSPD literature admitted the need for a broad-based interagency culture, the program currently targets only seasoned professionals (GS-13 and above). The NSPD initiative will be covered in further detail later, as it does represent a concrete program to improve human capital across the USG. In short, NSPD is more than just a study, which makes it unusual.
The most recent effort to address human capital was the work by PNSR. 6 This enormous undertaking, released in November 2008, contained bold measures to revamp the entire national security apparatus. The study went far beyond the human capital problem, although that topic did occupy a prominent place within the 800-page volume. Specifically, PNSR conducted a comprehensive review of the difficulties in producing human capital for interagency work, and offered a number of recommendations for improvement, including some ideas borrowed from previous studies.
Two PNSR ideas in particular are important to this paper's discussion. First, the study suggested creating a national security professional corps (NSPC) that is truly independent from the parent departments. The idea of a centralized, independent structure differs from the current NSPD undertaking. While NSPD also strives to create national security professionals, its program is decentralized, relying upon the departments as the -primary engines of the effort.‖ 7 According to PNSR, an independent corps offers a distinct advantage, because -it would eliminate… [governmental] reluctance to give up personnel for interagency positions.‖ 8 PNSR's second important concept was that -NSPC status should be tied to individuals and not based on the position they hold.‖ 9 This concept would enable NSPC officers to move in and out of the new interagency structure while maintaining a special ‗watermark' throughout their careers.
Such mobility might provide an incentive for people to commit to an interagency career.
After reviewing government studies and efforts up to this point, it should be apparent that the USG lacks an enduring strategy for developing human capital; it keeps updating the blueprint, but never gets around to actually building anything (with the recent exception of the NSPD). As suggested in the introductory chapter, this lack of follow-through is probably due to inertia in the face of a complex problem. The next chapter will examine this complex problem in detail. 
Notes
The Human Capital Problem
A useful way to approach the complex problem is to propose a definition of the ‗ideal interagency expert.' 1 This perfect employee starts his or her career on a well-defined track specifically designed to develop people for interagency service. After spending 5-10 years maturing as a departmental specialist, the employee enters the interagency workforce. While maintaining credibility in original departmental functions, he or she transforms into a generalist, becoming proficient and comfortable working outside of customary lanes with people from other agencies. This interagency expert is fully familiar with jargon from multiple branches of government, understands and appreciates the agendas of other USG employees, and maintains focus on interagency goals above all else. He or she is motivated to excel by the promise of promotion within the interagency workforce, is supported by a well-defined ‗chain of command', and actively works to improve interagency cooperation.
To develop any sort of interagency workforce, whether in accordance with the proposed ‗ideal' or some other model, the USG must address three overarching topics: timeline, structure, and people. Specifically, the government needs to weigh the time investment required by the undertaking, and whether that investment will address immediate needs. Furthermore, the USG must decide how it will structure its human capital system, since organization will be crucial in attracting, supporting, and retaining the best employees for interagency work. Finally, the government must ponder who it wishes to recruit, and weigh the incentives which might attract those people to an interagency career. One major roadblock to interagency momentum has been the problem of developing an organizational structure for the workforce. The government must determine the best way to organize its experts. For instance, the ‗ideal' model suggests a permanent bureaucracy with all the requisite supporting mechanisms: career hierarchy, pay scales, infrastructure, and above all, culture. In a sense, the model imagines the interagency workforce as a centralized, ‗horizontal stovepipe' that cuts across existing departments. Since this bureaucratic structure does not exist today, the government would have to build it from the ground up, presumably at considerable expense. Another possibility is an interagency workforce that ‗overlies' the existing bureaucracy. In this case, the current departments and agencies would supply all supporting mechanisms for the workforce, leading to a highly decentralized structure. Although possibly less expensive, this second structure presents its own problems, since organizations would need to integrate both interagency generalists and stovepipe specialists under the same roof. In between these two structures lie a variety of possibilities. Finally, it is important to remember that any proposed workforce structure might need to dovetail with a much larger re-structuring of the national security apparatus, as proposed by PNSR. Their broader recommendations focus on aspects ranging from the National Security Council to congressional oversight committees. The PNSR model is centrally directed, which might make any sort of decentralized workforce problematic.
Having described the topics of timeline and structure, this chapter finishes by considering the people angle. Two aspects of this topic require discussion: first, an investigation of the candidate pool itself, and second, a consideration of possible incentives for people to embark upon interagency careers. The candidate pool includes four types of professionals: government civilians, individuals from the private sector, government contractors, and military personnel.
Many government civilians already understand the concept of interagency work, and in some cases, may have experience working across departmental boundaries. They are the people closest to the problem, and might be the best ones to help the government move toward a solution. Unfortunately, these people already belong to departments, so their departure to interagency jobs leaves government agencies with a manning problem. Private individuals, on the other hand, may be unfamiliar with the bureaucracy, but they bring fresh perspectives and unique capabilities. Their involvement in interagency work does not affect departmental manning, but does equate to an expansion of the overall USG payroll, which could lead to fiscal and political tensions.
Increasingly, the USG has adopted the strategy of hiring contractors as a hedge against payroll enlargement. Employing contractors as part of an interagency workforce has some obvious benefits, but also possible drawbacks. As with civilian-sector newcomers, contractors allow interagency capacity to grow without stripping the departments of their manpower. Also, if managed correctly, contractors might help preserve the corporate knowledge that tends to be lost when government employees fulfill their interagency tasks and move back quickly into their respective stovepipes.
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As an example of capitalizing on contractors' corporate knowledge, S/CRS employs these professionals to teach courses in their interagency schoolhouse. Since interagency efforts can also be domestic in nature, DoD might consider a parallel program that trains some officers to work in the domestic interagency arena. The National Guard Bureau might best orchestrate such an effort. In both cases, foreign and domestic, the military enjoys an enormous manpower advantage over the civilian departments. Although stretched thin after years of personnel cuts, DoD is still better positioned than most to support whole-of-government enterprises. Like DoS, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is responsible for filling a portion of the new CRC-A positions. USAID has also noticed an interest in these jobs, this time from people in the private sector. The incentive issue here is more complicated. It appears that people are responding to a short-term job opportunity, even though they realize there may not be a long-term job for them once their tour is complete. 13 The incentive for these newcomers to join might be personal, involving a positive feeling of accomplishment, or it may be professional, meaning a chance to add a particular experience to their resumes. Incidentally, long-term CRC jobs are uncertain because future funding of the CRC is still in question. As a general comment, uncertainty about the future of the CRC, or any interagency initiative, might prove to be a disincentive for people to join. Should the government truly commit to interagency initiatives, for instance by passing legislation, then candidates might also be more likely to commit.
Not surprisingly, interagency recruitment must also address departmental incentives when current government employees are being considered. Again referring to the CRC-A situation, departments have agreed to release their employees with the understanding that S/CRS will pay their salaries during their interagency tours. This financial arrangement amounts to backfill funding, since the departments would be able to hire temporary replacements until their employees return. Furthermore, recruited people will occupy office space in the parent departments, even though they work directly for S/CRS during their tours. This arrangement leads to the ‗overlay' concept discussed under structure, and will result in additional costs for the departments. In a nod toward incentivizing the departments, S/CRS will also pay for these overhead costs. 
Initiatives Already Underway
Having discussed what the USG could do to build an interagency workforce, this paper moves now into a discussion of some ongoing initiatives in building and employing human 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
The S/CRS initiative within DoS is a functional interagency approach to the R&S problem.
National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) called upon the State Department -to lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.‖ 1 DoS created S/CRS to meet these requirements. New to the government structure, What does this mean for the future of the JIACG concept? Like other interagency initiatives before it, the JIACG might be disappearing before its time. On the other hand, the JIACG may have fulfilled its purpose as an interagency stimulus, and now the Combatant Commands will move in new directions to accomplish their interagency coordination. According to one commentator conversant on the topic, it is not the JIACG structure that is important, but rather the interagency capability it was intended to foster.
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Foreign Area Officers
The 
National Security Professional Development
Finally, this chapter returns to the NSPD initiative introduced earlier in the literature review. While other workforce programs address functional interagency needs, NSPD suggests a broader method to address all national security issues. Essentially, NSPD is a framework to inculcate interagency expertise within the government, and to hone a corps of upper-level professionals capable of leading interagency efforts across the national security spectrum.
According to one NSPD official, the program's focus on upper-level employees is just the first stage, involving 20,000 people in the national security structure, 1,500 of whom work in the Senior Executive Service (SES). 23 For those aspiring to the SES, and in accordance with the NSPD strategy, departments have begun to emphasize an interagency ‗tour' as a prerequisite for promotion. 24 Such emphasis is not unique to the NSPD era; as early as the Hart-Rudman study, the government has considered interagency experience a desirable quality for its SES employees.
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Despite its role in building an interagency workforce, NSPD is not a schoolhouse like the training program run by S/CRS; in fact, it does not have its own budget, and therefore depends upon the energies of the individual departments to fulfill its mandate.
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Because of this dependent status, and its lack of legislative backing (there is no NSPD equivalent to the Goldwater-Nichols Act), the program faces an uncertain future under the new administration. 
Possible Models for Capacity-building
Having investigated several current efforts to meet human capital challenges, this paper will now consider four different models the USG might employ in its future workforce-building Even with centralized control, the timeline remains undefined, illustrating that nobody really knows how long an ambitious human capital project will take. The management-level population might not need a significant training/education program since they presumably enjoy some understanding of what ‗interagency' entails. However, if the model follows the PNSR literature, then aspiring leaders must fulfill an interagency tour of -significant duration‖ prior to applying for critical SES positions. 5 Such tours will take considerable time when summed across all the departments. In addition, NSPD/PNSR creates its interagency corps from workers at all career levels, and recommends similar rotational tours for them as well. The resulting professionals will be very close to the ‗ideal' posited in chapter three, but all of this development activity adds up to a long-term effort that might take a decade or more to realize.
On the subject of structure, the combined NSPD/PNSR model represents the ‗horizontal stovepipe', with particular advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the centralized structure provides a secure and understandable environment in which the interagency corps works, with its own system of incentives, promotions, and assignments. 6 On the negative side lies the cost and time of creating such a bureaucratic structure from the ground up, since nothing like it exists today. The PNSR report acknowledges the need for more people by invoking the personnel ‗float' concept, which would enable the necessary training and rotational assignments once the system is operational. However, first achieving that operational level will require more than just a float; it will mean hiring a lot of new people.
Another significant aspect of the NSPD/PNSR structure involves education, specifically new educational institutions and a career-spanning program to develop the interagency corps. This emphasis on long-term education derives from all the previous major studies on building interagency capacity. As a future goal, an educational structure has merit; for example, many would point to DoD's culture of ‗professional military education' as a positive example.
Unfortunately, it also adds to the cumbersome work entailed in building the bureaucratic structure. Clearly, the USG will need to overcome considerable inertia to enable the NSPD/PNSR model.
The personnel angle of the NSPD/PNSR model reveals its greatest attraction. First, individuals would enter a long-term government career on equal footing with their peers in traditional departments, supplying both incentive to join and incentive to stay. They also would have the leeway to move in and out of the corps, allowing them to maintain credibility within their original career fields, per the definition of the ‗ideal interagency expert.' Second, the departments benefit because a standing interagency corps obviates their need to release people for interagency tasks, reducing the manning turmoil they face today. Third, the combined NSPD/PNSR model fixes a candidate problem within the current program. Under today's NSPD program, military, intelligence community, and Foreign Service personnel are excluded because those departments allegedly develop their own interagency capacity. 7 While this is true to a certain extent, these independent programs need to be integrated with the broader capacitybuilding enterprise. The PNSR report wisely makes no such exclusion to membership, and thus the combined NSPD/PNSR model opens the candidate pool to everyone.
CRC Model
The proposed CRC model takes the current State Department initiative and applies it to all large-scale interagency concerns. In this model, think of the CRC as a Response Corps (RC), since an RC might include military personnel as well. To begin, the government manages the system centrally, and defines areas of interagency concern. For instance, the USG should develop an RC to deal with domestic disasters, a solution for the post-hurricane Katrina experience. In addition, the government might create an RC to address homeland anti-terrorism efforts. Each additional corps would vary in size according to its functional responsibilities, and each would report to its own lead agency, just as the current CRC reports to DoS.
The timeline to create the CRC model is measurable. Three years elapsed from the creation of S/CRS to the birth of the CRC, so history suggests a similar timeline for other RCs. Even better, since the blueprint already exists, future corps should generate even more quickly. This short timeline is one of the strongest arguments for the CRC model, and enables some of its structural characteristics.
Structurally, the CRC model is fairly simple and has the added benefit of being scalable.
As the government determines new interagency needs, it can build RCs as required.
Furthermore, as needs shrink, so too can specific RCs. Another benefit, discussed in chapter three, is the model's ‗overlay' structure, which diminishes the time, expense, and inertia of creating a completely new bureaucracy. As with all of the models, the CRC structure results in a net increase in government employees, either to populate the RCs with civilian sector specialists, or to temporarily backfill department employees who join the active components of the RCs. In any case, payroll expansion is a necessary bill for interagency capacity. Fortunately, the existence of the standby component, people who are not ‗backfilled' when they deploy, could keep the manpower bill from climbing so high.
From the personnel angle, the CRC model requires a careful look. One of the model's greatest strengths is its ability to develop an interagency worker rapidly. Rather than requiring a career-long path of interagency education, an RC member undertakes a regimen of interagency training through a ‗schoolhouse' hosted by the lead agency. Instead of requiring years of preparation, an interagency worker can be ready in months. The model presumes a worker's competency in his or her field of expertise, so that only a ‗top off' is sufficient to prepare the individual for interagency work. While this training populates the RCs rather quickly, it does not address the parent agency's problem of finding and training suitable backfill personnel.
The rotational nature of the CRC workforce is also problematic. While the rotations enable the departments to retrieve their experts after relatively short absences, the system also bleeds its corporate knowledge, especially since an RC member is under no obligation to reenlist for future tours. As already noted, lack of corporate knowledge has crippled interagency efforts to date, and remains one the foremost obstacles to current interagency efforts.
Furthermore, a CRC worker might not actually deploy over his or her two-year window of opportunity. The deployment provides the actual interagency experience, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, experience is one of the keys to interagency success. Such is the nature of creating a standing deployment capability, an inherent weakness of the CRC model. Workers wishing to hedge against the risk to career might be inclined to ‗moonlight' with their parent organization, especially since that organization is still providing office space and overhead support. Unfortunately, this model cannot effectively dictate to the departments because of its decentralized nature and its short-term view regarding its employees.
Single-track FAO Model
A single-track model for the interagency, based upon the system used by the Army and Navy, builds a permanent interagency workforce within each USG agency. Structurally, the single-track model is uncomplicated. The only new bureaucracy required is the central controlling entity, an executive body which sets the ground rules for FAO development and determines interagency tasks requiring FAO expertise. For instance, the controlling body might determine a need for a commerce specialist on a PRT, and would consequently levy that requirement on the Commerce Department. Of course, the departments' payrolls would need to expand commensurate with their interagency responsibilities. While this might be costly, it is not complex.
As with the other models discussed so far, the personnel side of the single-track model poses advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the system develops long-term interagency workers who are secure in their chosen career path. Furthermore, FAOs know they are going to be employed in their fields of expertise. Different from the CRC model, the FAO model produces just enough experts to cover the known interagency requirements; there is no manpower overage waiting for a short-notice phone call to deploy. At the same time, this ‗perfect fit' system will cause internal strains. The training pipeline will find itself constantly expanding and contracting to meet demand, and in times of surge, existing FAOs will be become overworked, high-value commodities. This surge problem may have led to the recent ramp-up in DoD FAO production.
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Another drawback, specific to the single-track model, is that FAOs will slowly lose their original specialist identities. Recall that an ‗ideal interagency expert' maintains credibility through periodic re-immersion in original skill sets. Single-track FAOs, by contrast, will not cycle back into their earlier missions. Even though they remain members of their departments, their focus shifts permanently to something different from the fundamental missions they used to know. This evolutionary problem is something that the dual-track FAO model attempts to address.
Dual-track FAO model
The dual-track model differs from the single-track model in just a few important ways.
The first difference lies in the timeline consideration. Dual-track FAOs take as long to develop as their single-track peers, but the model adds an additional corps of specialists who serve in the interagency for just one ‗tour' before returning to their original mission areas. These people would not need the same level of experience as the FAOs, so their training would be considerably shorter. Also, they would alleviate some of the FAO stress incurred during surge periods, making the system more responsive to real-world perturbations.
From a personnel consideration, the dual-track model is more complicated. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Developing human capital for interagency work remains a critical concern for the United States. To illuminate the human capital problem, this paper traced USG development efforts over the past twelve years, highlighting a series of studies that culminated in the recent work by the Project on National Security Reform. Although considerable effort went into all of these studies, there has been a discouraging lack of resulting progress by the government. To better explain this observation, the paper investigated the complexity of the human capital problem in terms of three overarching topics: timeline, structure, and people.
Timeline is a critical consideration, since the government must act quickly to fix its human capital shortage. However, short-term remedies might not provide the right sort of interagency experts needed, so long-term action is also necessary. In addition, the government must choose a bureaucratic structure to support its interagency workforce. Possible structures include a new centralized organization, or in contrast, a decentralized model that relies upon existing departments and agencies. In any case, the structure should provide the sort of career development opportunities and incentives necessary to attract and retain the best employees.
This idea led to a discussion of the types of people available for interagency work. Current government employees, private individuals, government contractors, and military members are all potential interagency employees. Each type comes with particular strengths and weaknesses that must be considered in building an interagency workforce.
After defining the complex human capital problem, the paper studied several on-going efforts to build interagency capacity. Notably, the State and Defense Departments have made some progress in developing human capital, as has the presidentially directed National Security Professional Development program. Based upon these efforts, the paper introduced four plausible models to develop human capital. Although each model has merit, no single one would adequately solve the complex problem alone. Therefore, this paper concludes that the government needs a grand strategy that ties several models together.
The recommendation is for a strategy with two parts, one for the short term (probably less than ten years) and one for the long. Both parts should be initiated as soon as possible, in order to provide continuity when they intersect at some point in the future. The short-term part recognizes that today's human capital initiatives show promise. For instance, people currently see value in joining the Civilian Response Corps, and to interfere with such progress would certainly be counterproductive. Consequently, the government should nurture such initiatives, and protect them from new, well-intentioned ideas that might tend to smother current gains. The government should implement this short-term goal using a composite of the last three models analyzed in the previous chapter.
The composite structure would include three layers of capability, similar to the IMS initiative, but striving to produce interagency capacity, rather than simply to employ it. The top layer, composed of decision-makers, would provide the centralized guidance recommended in both the CRC and FAO models. The people for this job already exist in government; they are the early graduates from the NSPD program, and senior officials who have interagency experience. This top layer would require a modest bureaucratic investment in time and money.
The middle layer would supply the corporate knowledge of the system, and would probably take the longest to populate. These people would be full-time interagency specialists drawn from the multi-agency FAO model. Whether single-or dual-track, they would provide the capacity for training, planning, and executing steady-state interagency efforts, both domestically and abroad. As with the FAOs in the Defense Department, their numbers should be carefully tailored to match the actual jobs they fill, in addition to an obligatory ‗float' for training and rotations.
The bottom layer would be composed of RCs. These are the people who would supply the interagency surge capacity so sorely lacking to date. When deployed, they would file into structures already designed for them, such as PRTs. RC members would not necessarily be subordinate to the FAOs; rather, they would supplement FAO capacity, much like the IPCs supplement the JFC planning staffs, and the ACTs supplement the Country Teams. The good news is that one RC is already coming together under DoS, and as one interagency observer noted, the Army Reserve could serve as an RC all by itself. 1 This blended model would not be inexpensive, but it has two short-term advantages.
First, it would rely primarily on bureaucratic structures already in existence (the ‗overlay' structure), thereby eliminating some of the inertia that has plagued the government. Second, it would incorporate elements of interagency capacity that already exist, such as the Civilian Response Corps and the Defense Department FAOs. If the government could draw together the three layers, it would enhance its interagency capacity in the near future, preparing the soil for the longer-term part of the grand strategy. This second part recognizes that a strong corps of interagency experts would benefit from careful career planning and considerable investment over time. To implement this second part of the strategy, the government should adopt the NSPD/PNSR model. This model is the descendant of ten years of deep thinking, and as such it outlines the key tenets of producing a competent, durable, and sufficiently robust corps of professionals. The vision may not be attainable even ten years from now, but it will serve as a target for success. The USG should adopt it, implement it, and stop tinkering with it.
Arguably, the kinds of skills inherent in an interagency expert are the same as those required of an expert who works in the international realm. Just as interagency friction has been the focus of much attention, so too has the friction between the United States and other nations trying to work toward a common goal.
2 In a recent address at the United States Institute of Peace, Defense Secretary Robert Gates referred to the ongoing international efforts in Afghanistan:
To be successful, the entirety of the NATO alliance, the European Union, NGOs, and other groups -the full panoply of military and civilian elements -must better integrate and coordinate with one another and also with the Afghan government. These efforts today -however well-intentioned and even heroic -add up to less than the sum of the parts.
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Learning how to develop people with interagency skills may well assist the government in developing international experts, and advance its broadest efforts to succeed in complex, international endeavors.
Notes
1 Discussion with Dr. James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation.
2 Murdock et al., 62. 3 Sec Def Gates, Dean Acheson Lecture.
